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302 an end, it is impossible to see why it should allow me to look upon another self as such. The life and welfare of a given individual and the development of his powers are in themselves of the same value, whether I happen to be the individual in question or not. … Even an increase in the number of persons can scarcely be said to make any difference. The summation of zeros can never give us anything but zeros" (Ibid., p. 428). Hence as the result of this method of exclusion we seem forced to conclude that nothing except the general welfare and general progress can serve as the goal of moral endeavor. But since this cannot mean the welfare of persons, for the reason stated above, it must be the welfare of humanity as such, as realized in the possession by humanity of the intellectual and spiritual products of individual activity. But since this is the end towards which the general will is directed, morality is resolvable into the service of the general will.

Perhaps some will meet this deduction with scoffs at the pretensions of the new divinity, others may find it explained by Emerson's characterization of the age: "A whole company of ladies and gentlemen out in search of a religion." For such an attitude the author is quite prepared. The vast majority pass through life without insight into the nature of the ends for which they work and suffer. Apart from the imperatives of law and custom, the sense of obligation comes to most people in the form of an immediate and permanent satisfaction promised to those who do what society agrees to call right. What reason have they to bother themselves about the why? Hence, a failure to recognize in this theory a statement of the source of one's own moral enthusiasm would not be admitted to be a valid argument against its truth. As a matter of fact, the existence of such a devotion to the general will cannot be doubted, for all of us have seen a parallel phenomenon—a man who, at odds with every member of his family, sacrifices the best part of his life for what he considers to be the family welfare. The Fatherland may be such an object of devotion also; if so, why not the general will? Certainly if this be denied, many of the statements of this book become absolutely inexplicable. But it is one thing to admit that we have here a genuine expression of a personal ideal; it is another to assert that we have an adequate account of the moral life as such. The work before us, with its exhortations to use the objective method, pretends to be something more than the 'confessions of a German scientist.' If so, we are entitled to demand a fair amount of evidence for every assertion made. Let us then take the statement that the pursuit of individual ends is in itself morally