Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/613

597 The strictly ethical portion of any system of moral philosophy necessarily depends upon the author's conception of human nature. To More's theory of man, then, we must first turn our attention. The human mind, if the term be taken in its most general sense, and not restricted to the intellect (as is done in some passages by More), is composed of two parts. The perceptive nature has its seat in the cerebrum; the passions belong to the heart. Each is a unit, a little kingdom by itself. There is so much that is antagonistic between them that conflicts are inevitable. In these sometimes one conquers, sometimes the other; but the intellect is often enough victorious to take rank as the ruling power. Not only does it restrain the evil passions; it also regulates those which in themselves are good.

More's theory of the passions has no close connection with his other doctrines. It is not an integral part of his system at all. He might have held almost any other view with equal consistency. Nevertheless, from the historical standpoint, the fact that he advanced the opinions that he did is of importance. In his recognition of the intrinsic value of the passions he was ahead of his age. Instead of regarding them as a device of the evil one, something to be crushed as completely as possible, he saw that in themselves they were good, and that there could be no true virtue without them. His treatment of the passions shows markedly the influence of Descartes. The classifications and definitions read like an abstract of Les passions de l'âme. So close is the parallelism that there is no need to trace it in detail. What will serve the same purpose in less space is a statement of the differences between the two. Descartes contented himself with a reduction to the six primitive passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, pleasure, and pain), while More reduced them to three