Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/610

594 pale of divine inspiration. Strange to say, with their allegiance to the Platonists the Cambridge divines united a strong admiration for Descartes. It is true that in general mode of thought they had little in common with him. He was sceptical, cold, non-mystical, non-theological. Yet his object was the same as theirs; namely, the justification of the highest truths through reason. This common aim brought them into sympathy with him, and made them regard him as an ally rather than as an enemy.

In the writings of Hobbes there are two assumptions which especially aroused the opposition of the Platonists; namely, the egoism of his system and the arbitrary character that it gave to morality. Naturally, to some minds the first seemed of greater importance, while others could think of nothing but the overwhelming horror of the second. It is impossible to make any rigid classification on the basis of these tendencies, but, roughly speaking, More may be said to belong to the first group.

The most distinguished member of the school was Cudworth. His system is the most logical, and has the most permanent value. Its fundamental postulate is the immutable nature of morality. This he tried to prove by showing that all truth, and, indeed, all perception, involved the activity of the mind, and was not merely the impression of sensible objects. The relationship between Cudworth and More is of great importance, especially with regard to their writings, inasmuch as the latter was undoubtedly much influenced by his friend. Yet, in spite of Cudworth's prominence, More is the one who is most typical of the movement as a whole. In him Cambridge Platonism reached its highest personal development. He was the most Platonic of them all, and, perhaps for that reason, the most open to the influence of mysticism and theosophy. In common with the others, most of his books