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351 prepared to admit. Let us suppose, for the moment, that there were an unlimited supply of the good things of life, and that, at the same time, human nature were as predominantly altruistic as it often seems to be egoistic. Even in this doubly millennial condition of things, it would still be absolutely necessary, in order to the very existence of society, that men should be able in some measure to depend upon each other. It is only upon the basis of some definite expectations that one can live with one's fellows from day to day. Even in the family, justice of a sort would seem to be as necessary as anywhere else,—a necessary foundation for enlightened benevolence.

We shall now examine the remaining part of Hume's systematic treatment of Ethics. In considering this somewhat briefly, we shall merely be following the author's own example. And first we must notice Hume's general classification of the virtues. In the Inquiry, as well as in the third book of the Treatise, he distinguishes between virtues which are (1) 'useful to oneself,' e.g., prudence, constancy, good judgment, etc.; (2) 'immediately agreeable to oneself,' e.g., magnanimity; (3) 'useful to others,' e.g., justice and benevolence; and (4) 'immediately agreeable to others,' e.g., politeness, wit, and cleanliness. Even a somewhat casual examination of this classification will reveal its artificial character. At the same time, before criticising Hume, it is important to see exactly what he means. For instance, let us take the first class of virtues, those 'useful to oneself,'—prudence, constancy, etc. Hume does not by any means set himself the gratuitous task of showing that these virtues are, as a matter of fact, useful to oneself. The question really is: Why do I commend prudence, etc., in another? The value to the community of prudence in the individual, even when exercised in his own affairs, is not what is here emphasized, though that would seem to be the most natural line of argument. Hume is rather concerned to show, in his later work, that it cannot be from motives of self-love that one commends prudence in