Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/366

350 Since justice has no meaning for Hume, apart from the insufficient supply of external goods and the predominant selfishness of man, it might seem as if he would have us look for a thorough-going utility in all the particular rules of justice. As a matter of fact, however, he suggests that we do not need to carry our analysis very far to see that these rules are often, in the last resort, more or less arbitrary. Such cases Hume attributes to the natural processes of the 'imagination,' as determined by the all-important principle of the 'association of ideas.' It must not be supposed that we really have two principles operating here, utility and some arbitrary principle,—the two standing to each other in an unknown relation. The all-important thing is that principles of some sort should be recognized, where the ownership of property is concerned. Beyond a certain point, Hume would seem to say, it makes no very great difference how goods are apportioned, at least in the hypothetical first instance, and it is there, mainly, that the 'imagination' is conceived to come in as a complicating factor.

Such, then, is Hume's actual treatment of justice reduced to its lowest terms. Up to this point, we have admitted his assumption that justice concerns only our pecuniary dealings with others. But is this really true ? In order not to misinterpret Hume's position, we must keep in mind that he treats the obligation of promises in connection with justice, and as necessarily arising from it. But the ultimate reference is always to external goods, and the two complications always are the insufficiency of such goods and the excess of human egoism. It will hardly be denied that, while justice should always be differentiated as clearly as possible from benevolence, its scope is inevitably much greater than Hume seems