Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/361

345 Having thus considered, somewhat at length, this very important question as to the relation between the standpoint of Book III of the Treatise and that of the Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, as regards the springs of human action, we shall now proceed to an examination of Hume's ethical system as a whole. In order to understand his mode of procedure, either in the Treatise or in the Inquiry, one should keep in mind the distinction, explicit in the former work, implicit in the latter, between what he calls the 'natural' and the 'artificial' virtues. For instance, in the Treatise Hume contends that justice is an 'artificial' virtue, while he regards benevolence, in its various forms, as 'natural.' By 'artificial' he does not mean, as he explains, that which is a superfluity in organized society; rather does he hold that a recognition of justice is basal to all social life whatever. He simply means that the utility which, as he is going to show, all virtues have in common, is indirect in the case of justice and other 'artificial' virtues, while direct in the case of all the so-called 'natural' virtues. More particularly, he means—what, to be sure, is not strictly true that the effect of the so-called 'natural' virtues is immediately and always an increase of happiness, while, in the case of justice, etc., this is manifestly true only in the long run.

This at first looks like one of the many fine distinctions which Hume draws in the Treatise only to practically neglect them in the Inquiry, and that to the manifest advantage of his exposition. As a matter of fact, however, the position, though unsound, is quite characteristic. While Hume does not directly speak of 'artificial' as opposed to 'natural' virtues in the Inquiry, he does not seem really to appreciate his mistake and give up the distinction altogether. In both works he is primarily concerned to show the relation of the several virtues to