Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/360

344 with Mr. Selby-Bigge, when he says (in the brief, but mainly admirable introduction to his edition of Hume's two Inquiries): "In the Enquiry [concerning the Principles of Morals] there is little to distinguish his [Hume's] theory from the ordinary 'moral sense' theory, except perhaps a more destructive use of 'utility.'" For, as Mr. Selby-Bigge himself points out, even freer use is made of the principle of 'utility' in the Inquiry than in the Treatise. And I cannot at all follow him when he adds: "It would be easy to draw consequences from this principle which would neutralize the concessions made to benevolence, but he [Hume] is content himself to leave it without development, and to say in effect that utility pleases simply because it does please." Why the admission of a certain undefined degree of native altruism and the use of the principle of 'utility' should be regarded as necessarily conflicting, I have never been able to understand. As in most discussions where abstract 'egoism' and abstract 'altruism' figure, the supposed difficulty resolves itself into an ambiguity in the use of words. Even if the hedonist, in order to be consistent, is obliged to hold that one is always determined to act for one's own pleasure, a point which would certainly bear debating, he is not therefore committed to egoism in any offensive sense. If one derive pleasure from the pleasure of others, one is just so far altruistic. Whether or not one does derive pleasure from the pleasure of others, is solely a question of fact; and the inevitable answer cannot properly be used against 'universalistic hedonism' or any other recognized type of ethical theory.