Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/323

307 may mean. The divine will, which is not "a mere potency, but a living, organic thing," determines the reality of the individual wills; and yet "human persons" and "the supreme will of the universe" are both "ultimate existences," the only ultimate existences. If the human will is a manifestation of the cosmic will, how can it attain to a reality in this cosmic will that it does not already possess? Moreover, if the individual human will is determined by the universal will, what can the intellect do more than make us conscious of the ends prescribed by God? What can it mean to say, as Professor Caldwell says, that "the intellect, in making man conscious of an ideal world, becomes an active thing" (p. 479); and that "our artistic and religious and social consciousness, so far from merely furnishing us with unattainable ideals (Ideas), may all become dynamic elements in our lives" (p. 497)? Professor Caldwell could have done us a greater service, in my opinion, if he had given us a careful and comprehensive exposition and criticism of Schopenhauer's system, and taken care to indicate clearly the fundamental principles of his own philosophy. But his work lacks thoroughness and systematic unity. It discusses the various problems in their isolation, and does not reach down to any underlying principles which might give coherence and unity to the whole.