Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/152

136 only from God, the will of God is the immediate rule or criterion, though not the "whole will of God," since virtue was defined as "the conformity to a rule directing my behavior with respect to my fellow-creatures." But, as regards my fellows, what does God will that I do? From the infinite goodness of God, it follows that he must desire the happiness of men. Hence he must will such conduct on my part as is calculated to conduce to their happiness. Thus, the will of God is the 'immediate criterion' of virtue, but the happiness of mankind is the 'criterion' of the will of God. Hence we must consider the consequences of actions, and from these deduce all particular virtues and vices. We have now in outline all the essential principles of Gay's ethical system proper. The remainder of the Dissertation consists in an attempt to furnish an adequate psychological foundation for the principles above set forth. It will be noticed that this second part was as important for the development of the Associationist Psychology as both parts were for the development of early Utilitarian theory.

The author begins by remarking that man is a being capable, not only of passively experiencing pleasure and pain, but of foreseeing the causes of these and governing himself accordingly. The 'end' of action,—that pursued for its own sake,—is pleasure. That which man finds calculated to produce pleasure, he calls the 'Good,' and approves of it; while his attitude is precisely the contrary in the case of that which is known to have painful consequences. Now Good or Evil, when thought of, give rise to a proportionate present pleasure or pain. This is called 'passion,' and the attending desire 'affection.' Hence, by reflecting upon Good and Evil, desires and aversions are excited which are (roughly) distinguished as Love and Hatred. From these, variously modified, arise all the other 'passions' and 'affections.' It is a mistake to suppose that these latter are implanted in our nature originally, like our capacity for experiencing pleasure or pain.