Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/151

135 can be supposed to be laid upon any free agent without an express contradiction.

"This obligation may be considered four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: First, that obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural consequences of things, i.e., the consequences of things acting according to the fixed laws of nature, may be called natural. Secondly, that arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favor of our fellow-creatures, or the contrary, is usually styled virtuous. Thirdly, that arising from the authority of the civil magistrate, civil. Fourthly, that from the authority of God, religious."

Gay proceeds to show that complete obligation can come only from the authority of God, "because God only can in all cases make a man happy or miserable." A few paragraphs further on the author is as explicit as one could wish on this point,—a very important one, as hardly need be remarked, for the early Utilitarians, who, with the exception of Cumberland and (probably) Hume, agree in regarding the motive of the moral agent as ultimately egoistic. He says: "Thus those who either expressly exclude, or don't mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind, must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind be any obligation to me, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?"

We are now prepared to return to the question regarding the 'criterion' of virtue. Since complete obligation can come