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134 So much for the point of departure. We are now ready to follow the author's own attempt at a solution of the problems of Ethics. At the very beginning, unfortunately, he entangles himself and his readers in a fruitless discussion regarding the meaning of the term 'criterion,' which we may safely omit. In this discussion, however, he has occasion to define virtue, and the definition,—which he wrongly supposes would be accepted by all, despite differences in ethical theory,—is quite important for his own treatment of Ethics. He says: "Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other's happiness; to which conformity every one in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform is, or ought to be, approved of, esteemed, and loved for so doing." In justification of this definition, Gay observes that virtue always implies some relation to others. "Where self is only concerned, a man is called 'prudent' (not virtuous), and an action which relates immediately to God is styled 'religious.'" Again, as we have already seen, whatever men may believe virtue to consist in, they always assume that it implies 'obligation,' and that it deserves 'approbation.'

Before treating directly of the 'criterion' of virtue, the author chooses to consider 'obligation.' This section of the Dissertation is so important,—particularly with a view to subsequent ethical theory, as represented by Tucker, Paley, and Bentham, that the first two paragraphs will be quoted in full.

"Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy: i.e., when there is such a relation between an agent and an action that the agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action, then the agent is said to be obliged to do or omit that action. So that obligation is evidently founded upon the prospect of happiness, and arises from that necessary influence which any action has upon present or future happiness or misery. And no greater obligation