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87 carefully worked out contribution to an important subject," it is marred throughout by a strong subjective tendency.—The views of Meinong are to be found in the treatise, Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie. The work is more elaborate than that of Ehrenfels, and seems to go more deeply into the subject. A most important point is the doctrine that all appreciation of Value involves an element of judgment, and takes the form of a judicial feeling (Urtheilsgefühl). Meinong is successful in correcting the subjectivity of Ehrenfels, but the limitation of his own position is evident in the setting up of a kind of 'impartial spectator' as the standard of judgments upon human character. The strength of his work lies in its thoroughness; its weakness results from the too close adherence to the empirical standpoint. In conclusion, two observations may be added: (1) the importance of a treatment of ethics from the point of view of Value is considerable; (2) Ehrenfels' distinction between Eigenwerthe and Wirkungswerthe deserves more careful consideration than it has hitherto received.

Time is no longer regarded by any school of Philosophy as an ultimate reality subsisting for itself, but is looked upon as a relation or series of relations between events. The modern problem refers to the validity of the time-relations in their application to the ultimately real. If the time-succession is unreal, then change, activity, development, and morality are equally unreal, and the ultimate reality is unknowable. If, on the other hand, time-relations are predicable of ultimate reality, then it seems to follow that there is an endless process, inconsistent with the supposed perfection of the Absolute. Without hoping to clear these difficulties away, we shall try to prove that it is possible to form a rational conception of the relation of time-succession to the Absolute, which, in spite of its difficulties, does not involve us in the admission that reality is unknowable.—That there should be a real succession of events is an assumption necessary to explain our experience; and time, as the sum of the relations (of succession) between these events, is valid of the real.