Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/75

59 Thus, in the first place, Idealism recognizes that the deepest reality in the universe is a Conscious Activity not different in kind from our own consciousness, in which it manifests itself most fully. The problem of Ontology then becomes, to show how it is concealed and revealed in varying degrees in the various forms of natural activity known to the sciences.

This, however, is only a preliminary statement.

(b) The most fruitful form of this view is, I think, that which finds in Feeling the most fundamental medium of connection and communication between the individual and the universal consciousness, and which therefore regards the Absolute not merely as an 'Intelligent Will' or thinking activity, but as containing within it a principle of Feeling. One aspect of its very essence thus wells up in us and is experienced by us in the form of our Ideals of Value, the "Primary Sentiments," as Dr. Martineau calls them, of Wonder, Admiration, Reverence,—the impulses to seek for and realize Truth, Goodness, Love. Much of the mystery and contradiction that Hegel seemed to find in "Thought" becomes, I think, perfectly intelligible when applied to Feeling. I can see nothing contradictory in the gradual emergence of a universal principle of Feeling in and through a 'finite centre' of Feeling (the individual consciousness), which is thus aufgehoben without losing its individuality.

It will be evident that this rests on the supposition that Feeling is not merely an 'aspect,' 'attribute,' 'tone,' etc., of presentations, sensations, or whatever the cognitive elements may be called. Feeling I regard as an ontological fact, its momentary stirring and transient ebullitions being manifestations of a subjective store. I have assumed throughout that purposive action means nothing more or less than feeling-prompted action, where the end or purpose is the presentation or system of ideas that calls forth and conditions the feeling. It is true that it behooves us to be cautious in dealing with this question of the 'place of feeling in mental life.' Dr. J. Ward has most justly remarked that "there is, perhaps, no question that runs us further into the dim recesses of metaphysics