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58 § 4. An equal significance for the three aspects is claimed by the hypothesis to which- I have referred as Idealism. I regard the group of writers referred to above as not justified in arrogating to themselves the sole right to distinguish their ontological theory or method by this title. It would be less misleading to call that method 'Intellectualism,' since it proceeds by laying what is surely a one-sided emphasis on the intellectual side of our mental life; it refuses to regard the Ideals of Goodness and Beauty as having any worth unless they can be shown to be 'rational,' as the phrase is: i.e., unless they can be expressed in purely intellectual terms,—reduced to cases of the cognitive process or states of 'thought.' This is to subordinate all else to certain quite imaginary demands of the intellectual Ideal. In reality Truth is more modest. I proceed to set forth the complete Idealistic view, and conclude by indicating a fundamental difficulty in it; a difficulty, however, which does not appear to be fatal.

(a) I begin with the most general possible statement of the position. According to Idealism, the facts are explained if there exists a Universal Being,—'universal,' because in vitally necessary relation to each subjective human consciousness and to the objective system of things,—who is the fullest realization of all to which these strivings and aspirations of ours may be dimly discerned to tend. Idealism finds in the conscious and self-conscious life with its ideal ends,—the True, the Beautiful, the Good,—a key to the nature of the whole, the Absolute. It holds that "we must be in earnest with the unity of the world, but must not forget that, regarded as a system of forces, the world possesses no such unity. It acquires it only when regarded in the light of an End of absolute value or worth, which is realized or attained in it; and such an End-in-itself we find only in the self-conscious life of man,—in the world of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, which he builds up for himself and of which he constitutes himself a citizen."