Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/72

56 ideal of consistency, in this sense: the more consistently we are able to coördinate the results of the sciences with one another, the more nearly we believe ourselves to have approached to a knowledge of the universe as a whole,—of Reality, in all its kinds, considered as one whole; in other words, the more nearly we have approached to a completely unified knowledge. This ideal thus constitutes a standard of Truth in general, in distinction from the more or less particular or limited truths (factual judgments, hypotheses, and theories) with which we deal in science and common life. It is one aspect of Value, which may be called the logical, and is co-ordinate with the ethical and aesthetic aspects.

The motive which prompts us to seek for standards of Value in these three aspects, is experienced by us under the form of Feeling. Hence the standard, when we find it, is felt by us as an obligatory ideal: in Thought, an ideal of Truth; in Conduct and Character, of Goodness; in (creative) Art, of Beauty. The feeling for Value as Truth, which is the mainspring of all attempts at science and philosophy, authenticates itself: its authority needs no defense. To ignore it, or explain it away, would be to lapse into universal skepticism; and this—as we might with Kant appeal to history to show—is not a possible permanent attitude of the human mind. Men have rested in such a result for a while, but never for long. We may take it for granted that the human race will ever persist in the attempt to organize into one, and to make intelligible, all branches of their knowledge. Now in this attempt we must be guided by the significance we attach to the feeling for Value in its ethical and aesthetic aspects; and here the vital question is: Why may we not attach to them as much significance and authority as must be attached to the feeling for Value as Truth? Can we ignore or explain away the feeling for Value in two of its aspects, while we regard the third (Value as Truth) as supreme? I proceed to indicate two ways in one or other of