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658 It must not be supposed, from what has just been said, that the introduction is a mere summary. The translator takes his author very seriously, and does all in his power to inspire in others the living interest in Spinoza which he himself so evidently feels. Indeed, he probably goes to the extreme in emphasizing the ethical character of Spinoza's system of thought. For instance, in one passage he says explicitly, what is assumed throughout: "The ontology is subsidiary. What Spinoza was most anxious to do was to teach the true doctrine and treatment of human vice and human virtue" (p. lxx). I cannot but regard this view,—not an uncommon one, of course,—as on the whole erroneous. The Short Treatise and the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione show plainly enough, to be sure, that Spinoza's original aim was distinctly ethical. But the 'blessed life' for Spinoza lay precisely in contemplation; so that if, in the beginning, the metaphysical side of his doctrine was a means only, it later became, to all intents and purposes, an end in itself. The writer, who seems particularly interested in the religious bearing of Spinoza's system, devotes twenty pages to an exposition of the Tractatus theologico-politicus. While recognizing the serious difficulties presented by this treatise, he concludes that Spinoza's "object was most distinctly not rationalistic criticism, but to put the Bible upon a pedestal and to strengthen its authority" (p. lxii). This statement by itself, however, is at least ambiguous. Later on, the writer points out that "Spinoza's scheme of salvation" is "purely intellectual " (p. lxxxvii); and hardly seems to realize that a religion which consists merely in clearness of insight and suppression of emotion is, in the ordinary sense of the word, no religion at all. Of course, this does not mean that religion is necessarily irrational, or that true religion is ever so; but that, most certainly, religion does not consist in mere rationality. The treatment of Spinoza's decidedly obscure doctrine of the 'eternity' of the mind is rather unsatisfactory. After showing the difficulties, the writer concludes that: "Spinoza believes that the more reasonable we are, the better will it be for us, both here and hereafter; for us in some sense, although in what sense us is obscure" (p. xcviii). Nothing, surely, could be more non-committal than this.

The 'revision' of the translation of the Ethic has resulted in only a few verbal changes, and the paging in this edition corresponds exactly to that in the former one. The book is also supplied with the same fairly good index. It is to be regretted that, though the plates are practically the same, the new edition is distinctly inferior to the former one in quality of paper and clearness of print.