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HE science of ethics at the present time is in a state of sad confusion, to account for which various explanations have been offered. All that I wish, on the present occasion, to insist upon, is, that much of the misunderstanding and disagreement arises from the persistent ignoring of a certain fundamental distinction, equally obvious and important.

First, however, what is the object of studying ethics at all? Some people may approach the subject merely in a spirit of scientific curiosity. They may set themselves to investigate what have in fact been the moral beliefs among different races of men, what is the part played by morality in the process of evolution, or how it has come about that conscientious beings have been evolved. But these inquiries, though interesting, are to me of no ethical importance except in so far as they have some bearing on other questions. The point with me is this,—and I presume the same holds good in regard to others,—that I find in my pursuit of happiness that very often while such and such a course has naturally a strong attraction for me, I have what we term 'conscientious scruples,' quite apart from prudential calculations, about adopting it. And in reference to these scruples, there are two questions of direct personal interest, which present themselves for decision. First, shall I heed them? And secondly, if so, what is precisely the conduct about which these scruples concern themselves? If I am to give way to these moral promptings, I cannot be content blindly to follow a number of disconnected, hazy, indefinite impulses, frequently fluctuating and sometimes apparently conflicting. I must reduce them to order, inquire into their essence, and as far as possible arrive at a clear understanding with myself as to what in reality are the things which I scruple to omit or to do. In short, if I attempt to be moral, I must settle to the best of my ability what morality is, as understood by me. How, then,