Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/63



"Moralists are too apt to push their prescriptions upon the healthy, instead of reserving them for disease; to invent artificial reasons for what everybody, unless annoyed by exhortation, will do of his own accord; and to fancy themselves the improvers of Nature, rather than her vindicators and interpreters"

James Martineau. § 1. THE subject of the present paper arises out of the following well-worn topics, with regard to which I propose to discuss certain possible conclusions: (a) In what sense is Ethics a science,—how does it stand in relation to phenomena as they exist,—in what respects does it agree with or differ from the special sciences? (b) What is the relation between the science of Ethics and that of Metaphysics or Ontology? Involved in these questions is another: What constitutes a 'special science' in distinction from Metaphysics? The bearings of this question, have been discussed in an article in the October number of Mind, entitled "Psychology, Epistemology, Ontology, Compared and Distinguished." To this I may be permitted to refer, since what follows forms a sequel, or rather a complement, to it.

We may start with the definition of Ethics as having for its subject-matter the ultimate End or purpose, the supreme ideal of human life. With regard to such an End, the following questions arise: (1) What is the ground for affirming that there is such an ultimate End or ideal? What, indeed, do we mean by an End or purpose? (2) How far can we bring the End into clear consciousness, or get it stated in terms of our actual conscious experience? It will be evident that