Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/628

612 of nature are unchanging as the conditions of human nature, but not more so. Hobbes does not attempt to ground morality in anything more fixed than the nature of man, but this is far from being the uncertain thing that many of his critics seem to think it. The individual's caprice may change, but the conditions of his existence and happiness remain constant.

With these two rival authorities, natural and political law, there might seem the possibility of conflict. Hobbes provides against this by his distinction of obligation in foro externo and in foro interno. "The lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to putting them in act, not always," for in lawless society the performance of a nice morality would bring about the destruction of him who practiced it. "The same Lawes, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour, ... are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them, and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just. ... Now the science of Vertue and Vice is Morall Philosophie, and therefore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie." The laws of society are thus of secondary importance for ethics, regulating as they do merely external conduct, and not internal virtue. Yet they are of importance as furnishing the stable conditions which alone make it possible for morality to externalize itself in conduct. They preserve that peace which guarantees the safety of the individual in moral action. Their observance externally, therefore, becomes also a part of moral conduct. But it is necessary to remember that society is the source of moral law only in the sense that it is the condition of its external observance.