Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/621

605 So long as the belief either in the purely rational nature of man, or in the theological theory which formed the real support of most of these systems, lasted, the question of authority was not raised as a distinct problem. Yet the increasing skepticism of the seventeenth century could not but raise the issue. Deny the rational nature of man, or reduce the reason to a merely ratiocinative faculty, and the weakness of the old conception of natural law becomes at once apparent. Revise the optimistic psychology of Grotius, as was done by Hobbes, and his law loses its authority. The system of the former makes no provision against possible rebellion on the part of the non-social affections. The social tendencies as pure facts have no further claim to authority than that given by their actual predominance. The relative strength of the passions being altered, as is often the case, it is just as moral for the selfish tendencies to usurp the leadership. The fact must be idealized before it can assume authority over kindred facts. This idealization of the social factor in man was accomplished by Grotius through his latent theological belief. However strongly he may assert the purely naturalistic basis of his law, it is evident that its connection with the divine is that which gives it its show of authority.

Before considering the contribution which Hobbes made to the development of the problem, let us analyze more carefully its nature. A rough classification of the possible answers which may be given to the question, why the individual recognizes the moral law as binding upon him, gives us our first division into psychological and non-psychological theories. In the former class the moral law is grounded in the nature of the individual, not imposed upon him from without. It is in some way self-given or self-accepted. There is found some point of union between the individual and his moral environment, so that the latter is not regarded as anything foreign to the former.

This element, which represents the participation of the subject in the law, may be either emotional or rational. That is, the ego may identify itself and its interests with Pleasure,