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548 views on the subject of punishment are eminently just and humane; but here, again, his interpretation of 'Necessitarianism' is difficult to understand. "Necessitarianism of the objective sort, which magnifies the determining influence of environment, cannot even apply … preventive methods to agents who do not originate their own acts" (p. 241); while even 'subjective necessitarianism' cannot justify 'corrective discipline,' since it "must hold that character is an unalterable datum." "Otherwise," the author immediately adds, "there is absolutely no difference between freedomism and necessitarianism" (p. 244).

Chapter vi, "The Nature of Conscience," is perhaps the best in the book. As the title would suggest, this chapter is a careful analysis of what is actually implied in our concept of 'conscience.' Chapter vii, "The Origin of Conscience," on the other hand, invites some criticism. Two or three remarks will have to suffice. The classification of theories is rather confusing,—e.g., 'Nativism' is said to take three forms: 'Theism,' 'Naturalism,' and 'Intuitionalism.' This is an example of the author's habit of making divisions, where the members are not mutually exclusive. Again, while one has not the slightest interest in defending the theory of the empirical origin of conscience, the criticisms of that theory here made often seem lacking in point and vigor. Dr. Hyslop is quite right in holding that one's acceptance of the theory of evolution does not necessarily commit one to any particular 'type' of ethical theory. By showing this earlier in the chapter, he might have saved a good deal of space for more profitable discussions.

As already said, it seems to me that chapter viii, "The Theories and Nature of Morality," should have been made much more prominent and placed earlier in the book. Yet, short as the chapter is, it is weighed down with an over-elaborate classification of theories which can only prove confusing. Why, e.g., distinguish 'altruistic hedonism' from 'utilitarianism'? (See p. 361.) In admitting that "utilitarianism has always stood opposed to the selfish view of life" (p. 356), the author admits a great deal too much; while his arguments against the theory do not indicate a sufficient recognition either of its strong or of its weak points. As defining his own position, Dr. Hyslop says: "A general agreement with the position here taken is embodied in Professor Dewey's statement of the case" (p. 395). This is an unnecessarily roundabout way of saying that he falls in with the prevailing tendency, and practically adopts the theory of 'self-realization.'