Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/561

545 realize the essential difficulty in clearly defining the boundaries of the several philosophical disciplines. In particular, Dr. Hyslop's distinction between Psychology and Ethics is not clear to me. He says, e.g., "Psychology is the science of the phenomena of consciousness, and Ethics is also a science of a certain portion of those phenomena with their relation to, or issue in, conduct" (p. 7).

Chapter ii, "The Origin and Development of Ethical Problems," is really a brief sketch of the History of Ethics. It is presented in the hope that it will prove "a timely contribution for the use of teachers who appreciate the value of [the historical] method " (p. vi). Even if the sketch were in itself all that could be desired, it would be practically useless, without some previous treatment of the several types of ethical theory. As a matter of fact, however, this chapter is open to the most serious objection. The extreme condensation which is attempted would have made it difficult, even for a clear writer, to avoid possible misapprehension on the part of the student. Many of the statements here made are sure to prove misleading, and some are clearly incorrect. The following will serve to illustrate: Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" is made equivalent to "rational regard for the laws of the mechanical world " (p. 65), and his philosophy is styled "materialistic pantheism" (p. 66); the system of Leibniz is said to have been "intended to conciliate [!] Spinoza's doctrine with the theological presumptions of the age" (p. 67), while the philosopher in question is allowed to stand as an exponent of the Freedom of the Will (p. 68); Hobbes's doctrine is said to have been "supported by the conservatives against the liberal tendencies of the Puritans" (p. 80); Locke, who "did not exactly follow the lines of Hobbes's speculations," is said to have derived "all practical ideas, or moral maxims, … from experiences in pleasure and pain" (p. 81); Cumberland is classed as an "Intellectualist," with Cudworth, Price, and Clark (ibid.), while Hume is made to play the double part of "moral sense" philosopher par excellence (p. 84) and founder of "modern empiricism" (p. 86).

A long chapter follows,—chapter iii, " Elementary Principles." This is a detailed analysis of certain ethical conceptions, which throws curiously little light either upon Ethics in general or upon the author's subsequent treatment of the notions considered. On p. 106 will be found an elaborate tabular view of our mental outfit, which does not seem to help the discussion. Attention, by the way, is wholly neglected here, while Sensation is defined as "Affection or Reaction of the organism."