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458 from the facts contained in the voluminous earlier works of M. le Bon, and are emphasized with copious illustrations. The main argument seems to involve a petitio principii. We can only know the character of a people, apparently, from its expression in arts, institutions, etc., while the purpose of the argument is to show that the latter are the expression of the former.

This is an attempt to explain the development of all symbols by the action of two laws, the law of mental inertia and the law of least effort. The mind will not act unless excited by an external stimulus, and when in action tends to move along the line of least resistance. The first four chapters deal with the intellectual symbols. Most attention is given to tracing the development of language through simple mnemonics, picture writing, and metaphors, to the present complete phonetic system. A chapter is devoted to symboles de reduction,—the use of a prominent part of an object as symbol for the whole. An extended treatment is given of the tendency of associated objects to supplant the original cause as object of the emotions. This the author calls l’arrêt idéo-émotionnel. As instances he cites the worship of idols, and the tendency in law to prefer general forms of procedure to the demands of justice in the individual cases. By virtue of this law, forms which possessed utility in an earlier age, are continued after every cause for their employment has ceased to act. This is illustrated by the history of marriage ceremonies and court procedure among the Romans. Criminals and idiots return to the use of symbols suited to their stage of mental development. Part II is an appeal to the courts to revise their procedure by ridding it of the useless relics of a less advanced civilization. In a long appendix the author takes account of objections to his theory. The work is interesting in matter and in style. The only criticism to be made in regard to form is that the division into chapters is not always happy. The author has made a rich collection of anthropological material, but at times strains his logic in the endeavor to reduce it to the laws assumed by him as fundamental. The value of the book lies rather in the wealth of matter it contains than in scientific explanation of the facts.

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für ethische Kultur has offered prizes for the composition of a popular handbook of ethics, at once authoritative and constructive, and independent of all external grounds whether religious or philosophical. The book before us is designed to create an interest in this