Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/471

455 the problem, but because thought has solved it by destroying as meaningless the notion of things-in-themselves.

Though Reid does at times appeal to vulgar Common Sense, he is not so stupid as to think that a volume is required to exhibit this argument. He criticises Hume by attacking his fundamental assumptions, and did this in a way which won the admiration of Hume himself. In the course of his argument, no doubt, he leads us again to Common Sense, as the source and warrant of certain primary data of knowledge, at once unreasoned and indubitable; but the Common Sense to which we are thus led is not that of the 'plain man' as contrasted with the philosopher. Reid's point is that the philosopher shares certain fundamental beliefs with the vulgar, and his essential demand on the philosopher, therefore, is not primarily that he should make his beliefs consistent with those of the vulgar, but that he should aim at bringing the common human element of his intellectual life into clear consistency with the special philosophic element. It might be objected that, granting the existence of beliefs that present themselves in ordinary thought with the character of unreasoned certitude, systematic reflection on these beliefs and their antecedents must render it impossible to accept them as trustworthy premisses for philosophical reasoning. It is a commonplace that the senses deceive, and the more we know of the psycho-physical process of sense-perception, the more clear it becomes why and how they must deceive. Reid points out that those who make such an objection will be found to acquiesce tranquilly in some of the beliefs of Common Sense, while they obstinately fight against others which have an equal warrant of spontaneous certitude. Is it not then, he urges, arbitrary and unphilosophical, to accept some beliefs that cannot claim reason as their source, and at the same time reject others, which are on the same footing as those which we accept? Is it not rather the duty of the philosopher to give a provisional acceptance of all such beliefs, and then set himself to clarify them, and as far as possible build them together into an harmonious system of thought?