Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/450

434 and Scientific Systems," he singles out Hegel for his sharpest attack, the 'metaphysics' which he criticises in detail all through the book is the dogmatic metaphysics of a natural science which treats its quantitative determinations as measuring and comprehending reality. Certainly, if by metaphysics we understand a theory as to the constitution of reality, we find plenty of metaphysics in Professor Riehl's own work. For example, in his chapter on the "Reality of the External World," he argues (pp. 134-136) that "consciousness involves the relation to something different from itself, the object." "The relative existence of things as objects of consciousness presupposes absolute existence (existence independent of this relation)." I imagine that Hume might retort: "It is no doubt true that we must believe this, but if you call it knowledge, I ask whether you mean by objects anything more than I mean by impressions. If you do, I ask again whether in your statements you are confining yourself to experience, to what may be verified by experiment. It may be that you are obliged to think that consciousness involves the relation asserted, but if you go further and assert that, because you think so, it must be so, are you not assuming the principle you criticise (cf. p. 135) that thought is the measure of being? Are you not transcending experience? "Professor Riehl might reply (cf. p. 154): "The only question is, whether we transcend with or without reason."—A reply, however, which has a much wider application than to the immediate question under discussion, and may be made to justify all that any sober 'metaphysician' would attempt. This chapter is probably the least valuable in the book. Doubtless there is reality, but if the author had followed the method of the succeeding chapter and shown that 'external world' is an abstraction just as 'body,' or 'matter,' and then proceeded to a more thorough criticism of what we mean by 'external,' by 'existing,' by 'relation to consciousness,' the discussion would have been more fruitful.

The chapters entitled "The Limits of Knowledge," "Origin and Concept of Experience," "Darwinism and Transcendental Philosophy," contain vigorous and weighty criticism of current scientific questions; while the chapters on "The Relation of Psychical Phenomena to Material Processes," and "Determinism of the Will and