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431 that, in all our speculations regarding the nature of mind, we must set out from the most complete and accurate statement of the facts obtainable, it is of course quite true and unobjectionable. It is, however, quite erroneous to maintain that our conclusions are always to be expressible in terms of the sensuous immediacy from which we set out. For thinking must transform the given into something not less but more real and concrete. And just because this something is the product of thinking—of idealization—it is no longer a sensuous particular, and cannot be 'shown up' or envisaged in inner experience.

As I understand Professor Ladd, however, this is the infallible test which he would apply to all results of metaphysical speculation. It is in this sense that metaphysics must depend upon a scientific psychology. Mind, for example, is real in the sense in which the experiences of the inner sense are real, i.e., it must be capable of being experienced as a real being in time, of being "actually implicated in concrete experience" (p. 197). Indeed, this sensuous immediacy appears to be for the author the sole test of reality. What cannot thus be 'laid hold of with the hand,' as it were, he tosses with a fierce joy to the "death kingdom of abstractions."

Lack of space forbids an examination of the chapters dealing with the relation of Body and Mind. The interpretation of the logical category of causality in terms of psychology affords, however, another illustration of the limitation in method with which I have just been dealing. The discussions of Materialism and Spiritualism, Monism and Dualism, are excellent. The author's polemic against the easy-going Monism which pronounces all differences unreal, and seeks to unify everything 'by simply clapping the hands,' is especially pertinent and happy. Against such an idle and unmeaning view, it is well to emphasize the truth of Dualism. But this position Professor Ladd is not yet inclined to regard as the final truth. We shall look with interest for his own synthesis in the metaphysical work which he has promised.

In conclusion, it seems to me only just to say that my own attitude towards the work as a whole is much more sympathetic than might appear from this review, as I have naturally dwelt upon the points in which I differ from the author. There can be no question as to the importance of the discussions, and with the general purpose of the book and much that it contains I am in hearty accord.