Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/408

392 be pleasure depending upon (1) the unimpeded (and effective) normal activities of mind and body; (2) a tranquil frame of mind, which, in turn, depends upon (a) external circumstances, (b) the feeling that we have acted 'consistently,' (c) the consciousness that we have acted for the common weal; and (3) a knowledge that others around us are happy. It will also be remembered that Cumberland distinguishes between what is 'naturally' and what is 'morally' good. 'Natural' good is the ultimate for Ethics. On the other hand, only voluntary actions which tend to that which is 'naturally' good, are 'morally' good. So much for the Good in general. Of course, what Cumberland sets up as the (objective) end of all truly moral action is the good of all, or of as many as possible.

III. As regards the Laws of Nature, we saw that the system did not really need such a scaffolding, and, indeed, that it was rather hampered than helped by it. At the same time, we had to recognize that the external form of the system was practically determined by this conception; also that it was here that we must look for Cumberland's application of his unifying principle, i.e., his deduction of the particular virtues. Hobbes had demanded that a Law should be 'clearly promulgated by a competent authority'; and had denied that, in this sense, the Laws of Nature were Laws at all. Cumberland, on the other hand, is concerned to show that they are technically such. They are 'clearly promulgated,' for the effects of actions are uniform; and we cannot doubt of the 'competent authority' in this case, for it is none less than the First Cause, the Author of Nature. The effects of actions were found to be treated only in so far as they belonged to the present life; but a sharp distinction was made between the 'immediate' [internal] and the 'mediate' [external] effects, for the confessed reason that 'mediate' effects were somewhat uncertain. The deduction of the particular Laws of Nature was found to be hardly adequate, but, on the whole, consistent.

What shall be said of the system which we have been examining? Cumberland's style is radically bad, his order of