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390 destroy that part which is necessary to themselves for the same end (2) to reserve to themselves that use of what is their own, as may be most advantageous to, or at least consistent with, the good of others." Thus abstractly stated, the principles may seem commonplace enough; but it is characteristic of the best side of Cumberland's ethical theory that, in carrying them out, he preserves so true a balance between duties of 'giving' and duties of 'receiving.' He himself says that, if confusion be attributed to him by reason of his recognition of the two classes of duties, the confusion must be attributed to Nature herself. Here, again, as so often, he illustrates his position by reference to what we know to be the conditions necessary to the preservation and health of any organism. His deduction of the particular virtues under each class, we need not stop to consider. Although Cumberland's ethical system has been treated topically throughout, in these two articles, it seems desirable to restate, as briefly as may be, the principal results of our investigation. This is the more necessary on account of the somewhat heterogeneous elements that enter into the system.

I. Hobbes had regarded man as a bundle of egoistic instincts, and had practically denied the existence of Right Reason. Cumberland insists, on the other hand, that the non-rational side of human nature manifests altruistic as well as egoistic tendencies; and also that man is essentially a rational being. Our sympathetic feelings are emphasized more when the author is thinking of society as an organic whole, while the rationality of man is usually brought out into strong relief when the discussion is regarding the individual. That the existence of sympathetic feeling 'fits' us for society is evident, of course. Our rationality, on the other hand, 'fits' us for society in a double way: (1) It enables us to see our own good as indissolubly connected with the good of society, and so leads to objectively moral conduct from ultimately egoistic motives; (2) it enables us to recognize and desire the Good in and for itself,—