Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/405

389 Indeed, Cumberland's argument for the existing distribution of wealth is curiously analogous to that of Hobbes for the absolute character of the then existing government. Hobbes had practically said : Any government is better than none; choose between an absolute government (the only stable one) and none at all. Cumberland, as we have seen, practically says: Some division of property had to be made; this actually was made; choose between this and "violating and overturning all settled rights." In this connection, he remarks that; with Grotius, he highly approves of that saying of Thucydides: "It is just for every one to preserve that form of government in the state, which has been delivered down to him."

According to Cumberland, then, our ultimate right to that which we legally possess, under the existing order of things, depends upon the fact that a recognition of the sanctity of property is essential to the stability of society; not so much upon the fact that our property enables us to promote the common good. If the latter were really the criterion, a partial redistribution of property every now and again might seem to be the inevitable consequence. My only object in referring to this is to call attention to the fact—somewhat important, as it seems to me—that Cumberland's criterion for the distribution of property applies only, or mainly, to the (hypothetical) original partition of the same; not to the actual distribution as we now find it. And the (actual) 'original partition,' surely, was made upon anything but ethical principles. With the last chapter, viii, "Of the Moral Virtues in Particular," we are not here specially concerned, as the fundamental principles have already been considered. The mode of treatment is sufficiently indicated by the following passage: "The special laws of the moral virtues may, after this manner, be deduced from the law of Universal Justice. There being a law given which fixes and preserves the rights of particular persons, for this end only, that the common good of all be promoted by every one, all will be laid under these two obligations, in order to that end: (1) To contribute to others such a share of those things which are committed to their trust, as may not