Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/398

382 to ensue in this present life, he endeavored to make up by distinguishing sharply between (1) 'immediate' [internal] and (2) 'mediate' [external] consequences. The former are emphasized considerably at the expense of the latter, doubtless for the reason that here one might plausibly claim greater certainty. The wicked may, in particular cases, appear to flourish in our own day, as they did in David's time; but the 'external' consequences of actions are by no means the only ones. By the 'internal' consequences, Cumberland might seem to mean simply the approval or disapproval of conscience, but this is by no means the case. He says: "The immediate connection between every man's greatest happiness of mind, that is in his power, and the actions which he performs to promote most effectually the common good of God and men, consists in this: that these are the very actions, in the exercise and inward consciousness whereof every man's happiness (as far as it is in his own power) consists." This is supposed to be "after the same manner as we perceive a connection between the health and unimpaired powers of the body and its actions." The case, then, is regarded as analogous to the connection between feeling well and being well physically. If this seem like begging the question, it is to be observed further that man can find free scope for the varied activities (particularly mental) in which his happiness so largely consists, only by acting for the common weal.

As regards the 'mediate' effects, or external consequences of actions, Cumberland acknowledges that we have here to do, not with certainty, but with probability merely. Still it is a very high degree of probability. In the long run, actions tending to promote the common weal must lead to a maximum of possible happiness for the individual agent; actions against the common weal, to a maximum of possible unhappiness. If advantages are not to be procured in this way, i.e., by acting for the common weal, they come under the head of 'things not in our power.' The Divine moral government of human affairs (here and now) is referred to as tending still further to justify the author's position.