Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/396

380 : Men may be killed by a profuse loss of blood, by suffocation, by want of food, etc.

These propositions, then, are given in human experience with sufficient clearness. Is there any power behind them, capable of enforcing obedience? The very fact that certain consequences, good or bad, apparently always ensue upon certain classes of actions, would of itself suggest that this is the case. But we can go further. The Law of Nature, as above stated, points out the way to the common good; God must desire the common good; therefore these [derived] propositions must be regarded as Laws of God,—in which case there can be no question as to the 'competent authority.' The good or evil consequences which result from actions, must be regarded as 'sanctions,' divinely ordained. In a word, these Practical Propositions, derived from experience, are not only Laws, but Laws in the completest possible sense.

We are now quite prepared to understand Cumberland's notion of Obligation. He says: "Obligation is that act of a legislator by which he declares that actions conformable to his law are necessary to those for whom the law is made. An action is then understood to be necessary to a rational agent, when it is certainly one of the causes necessarily required to that happiness which he naturally, and consequently necessarily, desires." Obligation is regarded as perfectly immutable, for it could change only with the Nature of Things. That anything in what is so vaguely termed the Nature of Things could change, Cumberland did not for a moment suppose.

In treating of obligation, the author sometimes uses language which might suggest determinism. It is to be remembered, however, that he is an uncompromising libertarian,—so far, at least, as it is possible to define the position of one so little given to metaphysical speculation or the precise use of