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374 philosophy directs us. But again, Cumberland says: "I have no inclination very curiously to inquire whether the happiness of man be an aggregate of the most vigorous actions, which can proceed from our faculties; or rather a most grateful sense of them, joined with tranquillity and joy, which by some is called pleasure. These are inseparably connected, and both necessary to happiness." This is one of the most ambiguous of the passages making for hedonism. It will be noticed, however, that tranquillity ' is distinctly stated to be an essential constituent of pleasure.

As regards the nature, or rather the cause, of this tranquillity, the author speaks earlier in the treatise of an 'essential part ' of happiness, i.e., "that inward peace which arises from an uniform wisdom, always agreeing with itself." If we act differently toward others from what we do toward ourselves, we have the discomfort that attends any inconsistency. But, in addition, "that great joy is also wanting which arises in a benevolent mind from a sense of the felicity of others." Of course, tranquillity does not depend entirely upon 'consistency' in thought and action. We saw but a moment ago that it depended materially upon external things. It also depends largely, according to Cumberland, upon the consciousness of having deserved well of our fellows. But it is characteristic of our author to insist upon the partial dependence of tranquillity upon having acted consistently.

So far, then, happiness is seen to consist principally in (1) the pleasures attending our normal, particularly our intellectual, activities; (2) tranquillity, which depends partly upon (a) external circumstances, (b) the feeling that we have been 'consistent' in thought and action, (c) the consciousness that we have acted for the common weal; and (3) the pleasure which results from a knowledge of the happiness of others.

What shall be said, then, with regard to Cumberland's view