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316 standpoint, are tersely described in the preface, from which, therefore, the following quotation is made as the best introduction to this notice:

"By the use of a double title I have tried to indicate that my aim in this little work has been at once critical and constructive. The philosophical creed which commends itself to my mind is what in the text I have called Intellectual Idealism, by which I mean the doctrine that we are capable of knowing Reality as it actually is, and that Reality when so known is absolutely rational. Such a doctrine seems to many to be presumptuous, contrary to the sober spirit of inductive inquiry, and based on an untenable theory of knowledge and conduct. My aim has been to show that these objections rest upon a misunderstanding of the idealistic position, at least as held by such writers as the late Professor T. H. Green and the present Master of Balliol. The general proof of Idealism must consist in showing that, while the determination of Reality by such categories as coexistence, succession, and causality, is capable of vindication so long as it is not regarded as ultimate, it becomes false when affirmed to be final, and that we are compelled at last to characterize existence as purposive and rational. There are various ways of enforcing this view. The method which I have followed here is to attempt to show that the ideas which lie at the basis of Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Psychology and Ethics, Religion and Art, are related to each other as developing forms or phases of one idea—the idea of self-conscious Reason. But, partly out of respect for their eminence, and partly as a means of orientation both for myself and for the students under my charge (for whom this Outline was originally prepared), I have examined certain views of Comte, Mill, and Spencer—and also, I may add, of Darwin and Kant—which appear to me inadequate."

It would be difficult to find a more competent hand for the execution of the task which Professor Watson has here assigned himself than the learned and profound author of Kant and his English Critics. In that volume, by a similar combination of exposition and criticism, Professor Watson achieved a result which marked him at once as a philosophical scholar and thinker, and a masterly expounder and defender of idealism. If, in his latest work, he has not been altogether successful, it is mainly because the subject was too large for this mode of treatment. In the brief compass of 300 pages one might, perhaps, with Professor Watson's knowledge and literary skill, have compressed a systematic account of Intellectual or Absolute Idealism; but to weld that doctrine to the critical examination of the theories of mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, ethics, art, and religion, which have been put forth by Comte, Mill, Spencer, Darwin, and Kant, was to run the risk of turning out a medley,