Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/323

307 being, and becoming. Space will be saved, and no injustice done, if certain of Professor Ormond's propositions are condensed, for in each case reference will be made to the number of the page upon which the several doctrines are to be found.

1. According to the author, the first of all principles is both self-explanatory, and explains the universe. It is absolute, self-active being; as Logos, it is self-conscious and personal.

To this, objection may be made by asking that self-activity be explained. The author regards causality as a lower, not a higher, genus than self-activity. Of self-activity he says, "no other category is self-explanatory." It seems to me, however, that either causality and self-activity are the same, or partly the same, or that causality is a higher category than self-activity.

If they are the same, or partly the same, then one may proceed to explain causality, or self-activity in so far as it is causal. But this is to deny that self-activity, in so far as it implies causality, is self-explanatory. The explanation of the "self-explanatory" principle becomes a problem of the science of knowledge (Erkenntnisstheorie). If self-activity be a principle that explains causality, then it would appear that nothing could be conceived of as self-active without being conceived of as without effect, and consequently that there could be no self-activity conceived of unless in the category of causality. An infinite regressus of causes in the Absolute is to me identical with the infinite regressus or rather the eternal existence of self-activity in the Absolute. Self-activity appears to require as much explanation as causality and to be explained by causality alone. I need not stop to demonstrate the genesis of the causal judgment.

But waiving for the moment the above objection, one may refer to the "spiritual insight," or "intuition," by means of which the Absolute is said to be apprehended. Even if this proposition were admitted, it would have to be shown how such intuition or insight is possible. It is, however, one of the great merits of the author that he is at pains to guard with perfect fairness his theory at such points as these. And in the chapter on Knowledge he makes a statement which seems almost intended to disarm the criticism which I have offered:

"The reality assumed cannot be every or any sort of existence. Let us start with some phenomenon which is a species of reality