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287 the nature of man. He is not without original altruistic instincts, and is, moreover, essentially a rational being. That his instinctive altruism tends to fit him for society, goes of itself. But this alone is not sufficient. Alongside of the altruistic instincts, are others that must be recognized as egoistic. The relation in which the two stand to each other is not clearly expressed, but, at any rate, it is evident that they would be likely to conflict, if reason did not furnish a rule of conduct. Now man's rational character fits him for society in a double way. (1) It enables him to see his own interests, not as some- thing apart from, but in relation to, the common weal. (2) It enables him to apprehend and desire the Good, qua Good, quite independently of the question as to whose Good it may be. Thus, "whoever determines his Judgment and his Will by Right Reason, must agree with all others who judge according to Right Reason in the same matter." Hence, to use Cumberland's own expression, "the fundamental cornerstone of the Temple of Concord is laid by Nature." In any system of Ethics, it is of course necessary to distinguish between the (objective) 'end' of moral action and the 'motive' of the individual agent. We have already seen, in the Introduction, what the 'end' dictated by Right Reason is, and we shall have to consider it more at length later; but it is important for us here to ask more particularly than we have yet done, regarding the motive of the individual agent—i.e., whether, and how, he can directly will the 'common good.' Here, again, our author's utterances are confusing. For instance, in Chap, ii, he says: "For universal benevolence is the spring and source of every act of innocence and fidelity, of humanity and gratitude, and indeed of all the virtues by which property and commerce are maintained." But when later, in the next chapter, Cumberland attempts to explain how man can will the common good, he rests the argument mainly upon