Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/293

277 of his own system, it is not impossible that he might have made 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' the end of moral action, but the important fact for us is that he did not develop his system in this direction.

We shall now turn to a more careful examination of the first English moralist who can properly be termed a Utilitarian. We have not here, as often happens, the difficulty of keeping in mind two or more different works by the same author, possibly differing in point of view, when considering any particular problem arising in connection with the system. In fact, the task might seem to be an easy one, as we have to depend, for our knowledge of Cumberland's ethics, wholly upon the treatise entitled De legibus naturae, which was first published in 1672. This, however, is by no means the case. While a thinker of no ordinary ability, and standing for a principle which has become clearly differentiated in the later development of English Ethics, Cumberland is so utterly lacking in a talent for exposition that the adequate presentation of his views is a matter of peculiar difficulty. Indeed, even apart from its singular lack of method, the fact that the work is so largely controversial in character, increases the difficulty of extracting from it the author's own system. The order of exposition is in many respects so unfortunate that one is tempted to disregard it altogether; but, even at the expense of some repetition, it seems desirable to begin by noticing the principal points in the author's own somewhat elaborate Introduction. Here he was certainly writing with his whole system in view, and it is well to let the somewhat heterogeneous elements that enter into it appear first in as close combination as they are capable of. After this