Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/292

276, into which morality could be resolved, he shows that some have taken 'sociality' as the first and simplest principle; others, 'zeal for the public good,'—"both parties supposing that there is no perfection or happiness pertaining to human nature which is not bound up with communion or society." But "it is the internal life of the mind, and the pleasure which is derived from a sense of virtue," that is the proper object of ethics. This would exist, if there were only one man in the world. It is not evident whom More has in mind here, and the criticisms which follow do not apply to Universalistic Hedonism (which had not yet been advanced, at least in England ); but it is clear that More himself had no thought to develop what we would now recognize as a possible Intuitional basis of the Utilitarian principle. As a matter of fact, the system is one of unconscious and undifferentiated Hedonism. More says, in substance: A thing is simply and absolutely good which is pleasing, not to the animal appetite, which man has in common with the brutes, but to the Boniform Faculty, which distinguishes him as a man. However, as the author frequently admits, this particular kind of pleasure is not sufficient in order to perfect happiness. A certain amount of external goods is necessary. The Good, then, is happiness, and happiness is pleasure,—but pleasure of a particularly refined sort, such as only a person of developed moral sensibilities could enjoy. The happiness considered is almost always that of the agent; but it would be as unjust to call the system Egoistic as it would be misleading to call it Utilitarian. In place of 'sociality,' or 'zeal for the public good,' More proposes, as the necessary unifying principle, "true and sincere love of God," and holds that all the 'Noemata' may be reduced to this. In short, we have here a theological system of ethics, unconsciously hedonistic, but never more than vaguely suggesting Utilitarianism. If More had recognized the hedonistic