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271 the right of defending himself against personal violence. To the governing power belong the "sword of justice" and the "sword of war," and—what necessarily follows—judgment as to the "right use" of each. But this is not all. Since difference of opinion concerning "meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest," etc., are productive of discord, the civil power must define the above. Also, the supreme power of the state is to be judge of all theological doctrines, in so far as they tend to practical results. In short, this power is "absolute," as Hobbes himself frankly calls it.

We must now ask: What has become of the Laws of Nature, with which we started? We have already seen that Hobbes refers to them as "eternal and immutable." In the latter part of De cive, he says, using words that Cudworth himself could not have objected to: "Natural [Law] is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born with them, to wit, their natural reason; and this is that law which, in this whole book, I have endeavored to unfold." But suppose that civil laws should be in opposition to these Laws of Nature? Hobbes meets the query with characteristic boldness. "By the virtue of the natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the Law of Nature commands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to obedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are universally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no civil law whatsoever, which tends not to the reproach of the deity ... can possibly be against the Law of Nature. For though the Law of Nature forbid theft, adultery, &c.; yet, if the civil law commands us to invade anything, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c." The conclusion to which we are brought by the philosopher himself is rather startling: Nothing in the civil laws can be against the Laws of Nature, because not only is