Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/283

267 this does not mean that Natural Law, as such, can be superseded by Divine Law, but rather that a special act which would ordinarily be a transgression of Natural Law may be right merely because God has commanded it. At best, however, this seems to contradict the fundamental principles of the system. But, aside from the question of a possible conflict between Natural and Divine Law, there is a further difficulty. Divine Law is what the name would indicate. In the case of such law, it may be said: God did not command an act because it was just, but it was just because God commanded it. In the case of Natural Law, the reverse would seem to hold true; but the language of Grotius on this point is somewhat ambiguous. For instance, we have seen that Natural Law may be ascribed to God, "because it was by his will that such principles came to exist in us"; but, on the other hand, Grotius holds that just as God cannot make twice two not be four, he cannot make that which is intrinsically bad not be bad. The undoubted confusion which one finds here suggests the difficulty of mediating between the views later represented by Descartes and by Cudworth: (1) that moral distinctions depend upon the arbitrary will of God; and (2) that they do not thus depend.

From the above it will be seen that Grotius insists upon the social and the rational nature of man. As to the proximate (not ultimate) origin of Natural Law, there seems to be a slight ambiguity. Now it appears to be founded upon the primitive altruistic instinct, and now upon the rational nature of man. Probably it would be fair to say that, according to Grotius, the two are equally essential to human nature, which he regards as logically prior to Natural Law, just as that is logically prior to particular civil laws. The relation between Natural Law and Divine Law has just been considered. Logically, the latter should always be in addition to, never in conflict with, the former. When Grotius practically does allow such conflict, we must regard it as a natural, but not a necessary, concession to theology. Again, the relation of God to Natural Law is not