Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/282

266 and Jurisprudence, the result being as fortunate for the former as for the latter. However, as Sidgwick remarks, while the distinction is clearly enough made in the body of his epoch-making work, De jure belli et pacis, still, in the general account which he gives of Natural Law, the wider ethical notion is retained. It will be important for the reader to keep this in mind.

In one of the earlier passages of the Prolegomena to his De jure belli et pacis, Grotius makes a significant statement regarding his view of the nature of man. Among the properties which are peculiar to man is a desire for society, and not only so, but for a life spent tranquilly and rationally. The assertion that by nature each seeks only his own advantage, cannot be conceded. Even animals manifest an altruistic instinct in caring for their young, while children show compassion at a very early age. In adult man, that which in the lower stages of development had manifested itself as instinctive altruistic conduct, becomes self-conscious and rational. And this tendency to the conservation of society is the source of 'Jus' or Natural Law, properly so-called. Natural Law would remain even if there were no God. But of the existence of God we are assured, partly by reason, partly by constant tradition. And here we are brought to another origin of 'Jus,' i.e., the free will of God. But even Natural Law, though it proceed from the nature of man, may yet rightly be ascribed to God, because it was by his will that such principles came to exist in us.

The relation between Natural Law and that which proceeds from the arbitrary will of God is of some importance. Apparently the latter is always in addition to the former, never in contradiction with it, though it must be confessed that the author's treatment is wavering. As Sidgwick says, according to Grotius, Natural Law may be overruled in any particular case by express revelation. It is to be noted, however, that