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620 any ultimate sense of the term, whether metaphysical or ethical. And this carries with it a recognition of the need— indeed, for Hegel, the inevitability—of reform. Of course, events have made us more critical of the principles of nationalism and more sceptical regarding the extent to which the collective life generally has become an expression of reason and right. Surely Professor Fullerton is entirely 'safe and sane' when he writes: "That the individual may, and if he is properly equipped for the task, ought, to examine critically his own moral intuitions and those of the community in which he finds himself, and should, with becoming modesty and hesitation, now and then suggest an innovation, means no more than that he and the community are not dead, but are living, and that progress is a possibility, at least" (p. 289). The Hegelianism of tradition finds an echo in such sentences as these: "To be sure, the court of last resort is the Rational Social Will. What is best for the State, and, hence, for those who compose it? What is practicable in the actual condition in which a given state finds itself at a given time? It seems too easy a solution of our problems to seek dogmatic answers to our questionings by having recourse to the 'natural light,' that ready oracle of the philosopher, Descartes" (p. 324; see also p. 326). It is argued (p. 352), that "it is the duty of an American to recognize himself as a Christian rather than as a Mahometan or a Pagan" for the reason that "I think we may be called a Christian nation." A genuine departure from Hegel does occur when, refraining from a detailed solution of particular ethical problems, the author suggests as guides "tradition, intuition and reflective reasoning" (p. 362) since "man has three counsellors: (l) The "objective" morality of his community—custom, law, and public opinion, which certainly deserve to be taken very seriously; (2) his moral intuitions, which may be of the finest; and (3) his reason, which prevents him from making decisions without reflection" (p. 302). What to do when these guides and counsellors differ does not clearly emerge.

Professor Fullerton distinguishes two doctrines concerning the nature and function of reason: the Kantian conception of reason as the source of ultimate moral requirements, as an independent law-giver, and the view that reason "serves its whole purpose in holding before the mind all its impulses and desires, revealing their interrelations, and making possible an enlightened and deliberate choice from among them" (p. 119). The latter view he regards as preferable. Reason is likened to "the presiding officer of a deliberative assembly, who insists that all the members shall be heard from, all proposals seriously considered, and that the ultimate decision shall justly represent the true will of the deliberative body as a whole" (p. 120). Desire is given a monopoly on motivating power, on the impelling forces that drive on to action. But in this case how can reason do as much even as restrain a desire from immediate expression and maintain a free and open