Page:Philosophical Review Volume 31.djvu/633

Rh The author espouses an "Ethics of Reason"—reason, however, not in the rationalistic sense but as a principle organizing the life of the individual and progressively expressing itself in institutions, customs, traditions, and laws. The impulsive and volitional nature of man are regarded as basic while yet it is maintained that ethical judgments can be passed only on beings who possess reason. This, it is indicated, involves membership in a community which is itself rational in the sense that its opinion, laws and organizations, however darkly or imperfectly, exhibit structure, prohibit and enjoin modes of conduct, conspire to certain ends, and themselves more or less consistently take form in accordance with the demands of reason. Wisdom and morality alike, it is contended, dictate a deep respect for the actual historical development of the community life and for the forms it has come to assume. Yet the actual social will is not ultimate; it must itself appear before the higher tribunal of reason, "the reason of the race—the reason appropriate to the race as enlightened and freed from the shackles of local prejudice and restricted sympathy" (p. 175). What are the aims of the rational, as distinct from any actual, social will? They are: "( 1 ) The harmonious satisfaction of the impulses and desires of man. (2) Such an unfolding of these powers as will increase their range and variety, broaden man's horizon, and give him an increased control over erratic impulses. (3) The bringing about of a social state in which the will of each individual within a community counts for something, and not merely the will of a chosen few. (4) The broadening of the conception of what constitutes a community, so that ever-increasing numbers are regarded as having claims that must be recognized. (5) The taking into consideration of the whole of life; the whole life of individuals and of communities, so that the insistent present shall not be given undue weight, as against the future" (p. 174).

Professor Fullerton's central doctrine is that of the "Rational Social Will." It seems to be essentially the teaching of Hegel, though stated in clear and modern language and modified under the pressure of subsequent psychological and historical developments. To be sure, the page devoted to the ethics of Hegel, and other occasional references, might give the impression not so much of a debt to this thinker as of a departure from him. Yet the difficulties found in Hegel do not seem to be successfully escaped. True, the author not only avoids sarcasms and diatribes in discussing the rights and the rationality of the conscience and the 'reason' of the Individual, but in fact gives these a very definite recognition; and, though stressing the fundamental rationality of the actual social order, is clear in his insistence on its limitations, imperfections and irrationalities—in short, its distinction from the rational social will. But, if sentences are taken in their context, it can scarcely be denied that Hegel, too, distinguished between the actual and the real, and insisted that only the latter is rational in