Page:Philosophical Review Volume 31.djvu/540

528 An interesting feature of Part I is the view brought out in Chapter II that Kant started out on the basis of several assumptions about what is good and right which are thoroughly acceptable to our ordinary ideas. Mr. Field makes two principal criticisms of the ethical theory of Kant; firstly, of the view that what is good must be good in itself, apart from all relations to anything else; secondly, of the view that the mere apprehension of a fact is sufficient to move us to action. In Chapter V, the only chapter which discusses to any extent the views of other writers than Kant and Aristotle, Mr. Field maintains that in one form or another Kantian fallacies are to be found in Moore's Principia Ethica, John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, and, though he is less confident in this case, Bishop Butler's Sermons. The exposition and criticism of Aristotle are interesting, although not marked by the simplicity, directness and clearness which lend such perennial charm to the ethical writing of Aristotle himself. The following constitute Mr. Field's most important objections to the Aristotelian views. He considers that Aristotle does not sufficiently distinguish between the good as the actual object of desire and as the ideal object of desire. In the second place, he is not satisfied with Aristotle's account of contemplation as the supreme good.

Part III is entitled "Towards a Constructive Theory." While, as is made evident in Chapter XV, Mr. Field does not base his ethical theory upon any particular metaphysical system, it is equally clear that his own point of view owes much to the idealistic tradition in modern British ethics. Like T. H. Green, he is especially interested in the analysis of desire and his treatment of that problem in Chapters X and XI is one of the most interesting parts of the book. In fact, Chapters X-XII contain the gist of the author's ethical theory. In Chapter XII he arrives at his definition of the good. He believes that the highest good should possess the characteristics of intellectual contemplation and should have reference, at the same time, to practical' activities. He considers that the sentiment of love satisfies these requirements. It is, he holds, a form of contemplative activity, it is complete and perfect in its own nature and is not made more so by any action to which it may lead; at the same time, it does lead to practical activity under appropriate circumstances (pp. 144-5). "Practical activities ... owe their value, when they are more than a mere means to the attainment of the ideal, to their being the appropriate expression in the special circumstances of the sentiment of love" (p. 145). The author thus arrives at a view of the supreme good which reminds us of that of Dante in the Divine Comedy. The arguments by which Mr. Field attempts to show that knowledge, aesthetic enjoyment and other activities are only of value as contributing to enlightened love are to the writer of this notice, decidedly unconvincing. In fact, many readers of the book who