Page:Philosophical Review Volume 31.djvu/496

484 Bacon so emphasises attention to the concrete facts of objective experience that he fails to appraise the subjective at its proper value—in other words, he fails to recognise fully the value of hypothesis in inductive procedure. Now we have already seen how Aristotle's tendency to 'rash generalisation' implies his recognition of hypothesis. Bacon tends by reaction to the other extreme, to over-emphasise the dangers of generalisation, and to omit hypothesis altogether. "Men fly from the senses and particulars direct to most general axioms, as to fixed poles round which disputations turn; and from these everything else is derived by means of middle terms: a short way, certainly, but precipitous; one which Nature cannot tread, though easy and smooth for Disputations."

Unlike Aristotle, Bacon does not (formally, at least) recognise the sagacity necessary to the formation of hypotheses. He considered his method independent of such a faculty. "But the course I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits and understandings nearly on a level. For as in the drawing of a straight line or a perfect circle much depends on the steadiness and practice of the hand, if it be done by aim of hand only, but if with the aid of rule or compass, little or nothing; so is it exactly with my plan."

The reason why Bacon refuses to recognise the value of the formation of hypothesis is to be found in his estimate of the trustworthiness of the human intellect. " Though all the wits of all the ages should meet together and combine and transmit their