Page:Philosophical Review Volume 30.djvu/645

No. 6.] addressed to the pure intelligence," the writer maintains that laughter is not due merely to understanding. "The apprehension of a situation is presupposed in laughter; but in order that laughter may arise, the situation must also be appreciated, i.e., must be judged in the light of an end to which the process or material, involved in the situation, stands in a certain relation of incongruity. The incongruity is an actual fact, so is the end, and therefore the appreciation is bien fondu, and is perfectly correct" (p. 290). It is impossible to reproduce here in summary the conclusions of the author's various 'Studies.' The book raises a great number of fundamental issues in a fresh and original form, and will well repay careful reading. But the reader is likely, I think, to be frequently perplexed when he attempts to combine into some kind of coherent view the various statements of doctrine. This, however, may only add to the book's interest. The difficulty of which I am speaking is not due merely to the unsystematic form of the volume, in being made up of separate essays, though this has doubtless enhanced it. But it seems to have its source in the author's distrust of systematic philosophy, which has led him to fall back upon the convictions and prejudices of common sense when philosophical analyses and constructions are necessary. If one seeks further in order to discover the grounds of this estimate, one finds the explanation to lie in Professor Baillie's conception of logic, and the nature of the system it constructs. For him the logic of philosophy appears to be a fixed set of general rules rather than a system of universal principles. His protest is thus in itself quite intelligible and even legitimate—a protest really directed against the tyranny of rules, against claims of finality and complete systematic character on the part of any philosophic theory that would exclude the full reality of individual assertion and creative action. If one has so conceived the systematic character of philosophy, such a protest has its value and justification. But is it not possible that the difficulty has arisen from mistakenly regarding the logic of philosophy in terms of rules rather than of principles? There can be no tyranny in a principle so long as it is not converted into a rule; it carries with it no claim to finality, but from its very nature leads on to further development. If we have not so learned the great systems of philosophy, we have in great measure learned them in vain.