Page:Philosophical Review Volume 30.djvu/644

628 restores the primordial unity and lifts it to a higher plane must proceed in accordance with principles that are capable of statement in universal terms.

Notwithstanding his distrust of logic, or perhaps rather because of it, Professor Baillie does not, then, seem to have succeeded in avoiding logical difficulties. When he comes to discuss the nature of knowledge, his analyses serve to emphasize the fact that knowledge is a possession of the individual mind, not something that is depersonalized and undergoes development on its own account; and also that it is not a mere play of subjective ideas but has a necessary relation to other minds and to a physical order. But again his distrust of logical theory prevents him from making clear how these apparently conflicting contentions are to be reconciled. Here, and in other discussions as, well, one feels that while his results are true in substance and need to be borne in mind, they nevertheless lose something of their point and value from the failure to bring them into an organized system of relationship. In this respect one may compare Professor Baillie's attitude with that of his predecessor, Thomas Reid, whose 'philosophy of common sense' gave lustre to the chair of philosophy at Aberdeen in the eighteenth century.

The papers on "Non-Logical Factors in the Process of Knowledge," " Memory-Knowledge," and "The Function of Emotion in the Conscious of the Real," are careful and solid pieces of work, full of instruction and the interest of concrete illustration. The last mentioned seems to me a most valuable discussion of its subject in spite of my failure to follow the author's method of coordinating emotion and knowledge. The principle of the final essay on "Laughter and Tears" traverses ground that is comparatively unfamiliar, and makes, I think, a distinct contribution to the understanding of the subject. Laughter arises from a realization of the incongruence between the end and the process or means through which it is realized. In order that an object shall be a proper subject of laughter, its end must be maintained in spite of the incongruity and the object itself must not suffer permanent loss (p. 259). On the other hand, tears arise when the end is hoplesslyhopelessly [sic] defeated, but is allowed still to control the desire to possess it (p. 273). These general theses the author develops concretely with abundant illustration drawn from life and from literature. It is interesting to note the sharp distinction which he draws between intellectual apprehension and appreciation. As against Bergson's remark that "Comedy is