Page:Philosophical Review Volume 30.djvu/643

No. 6.] from the first and in principle a mental operation consciously distinguished from, and even set apart by the mind itself in contrast to the other functions of the mind's life (more particularly the functions of feeling and striving), the difficulty in question disappears. For then it follows that it cannot expect to get the whole of the real world into its net, since it starts by being only a partial expression of the mind's life. The mind has other functions and other ways of approaching the real world, and no intellectual activity can be a substitute for these." But these different functions "are connected in their source and connected in their final purpose. They emanate from the one integral life of mind seeking at all costs and by all its operations to meet the call of the real world" (p. 37). "Each of these operations abstracts in order to achieve; but all are special expressions of the fundamental nature of the mental life, of which each is a particular form" (pp. 16-17). Emotion and volition are necessary to balance the achievements of thought. "When the mind is in possession of the resources and accomplishments of all of them, it reaches the highest level of its life. This consists in the restoration or reinstatement, at a higher level, of the primordial integrity of mind from which its being as an individual whole starts, and for the maintenance of which the enterprise and adventure of its experience are undertaken" (p. 38).

The different functions of experience have, then, an underlying identity which form the integral mind, and represent "the highest level of its life." But Professor Baillie's restriction of logic to a single abstract phase of mind makes it difficult to understand his conception of 'unity in difference.' It is admitted that at the highest level of the mind's life a fuller 'intelligibility' and 'satisfaction' are attained than is possible through the operations of the abstract intelligence. The question arises, then, has this 'intelligibility' no assignable order or form? Or, from the point of view of the mind, in what terms would the author have us conceive the 'globular unity' to which he refers? He rejects summarily as a confusion the concrete logic of Hegel and Dr. Bosanquet, while agreeing with them as to the limitations of what they call the logic of the understanding. But if the unity is to contribute to a higher 'intelligibility' it must transform the differences so as to make transparent their completary relationships ; it cannot be simply a common door through which they are all received. And in order that the result may not remain opaque, but become really 'intelligible,' the movement of mind that