Page:Philosophical Review Volume 30.djvu/548

534 exhibit clearly the differences which arise as one follows the one path rather than the other in metaphysical construction, is a task which is legitimate, important, and timely; and in this task it cannot be denied that the author has largely succeeded. But there appear to the present reviewer to be certain deficiences in the method followed. In the first place, the author exhibits a certain over-confidence in the fascinating art of manipulating concepts. For those who do not like panpsychism it is, no doubt, sufficiently amusing to pen up Messrs. Ward, Royce and Taylor in corners labeled 'subjective idealism', 'solipsism', 'a single point of experience', and to pierce them with shafts feathered by an ingenious dialectic. But is not this result reached by arbitrary selection of certain elements in their writings, and by arbitrary neglect of the more 'logical' elements which they all three share with Bosanquet? And in the second place, is not the main contrast between 'subjective' and 'objective', between psychology and logic, somewhat over-emphasized? Surely we are, each one of us, individuals, finite centers of consciousness, and 'subjective' elements, matters of sensation, feeling, and impulse, do play a major part in our lives. At the same time, in spite of this, we do feel some of the force of a logically harmonious system, and, under the sting of certain problems which can not be solved at the sensory level, we do try to develop a philosophy in which 'objective' and logical methods are at least prominent. Is not this true even of panpsychists? To the present reviewer it seems that the writer who accepts the main position of Bosanquet should recognize that all groups of idealists, facing the same facts of experience, are constructing a theory in which the elements shared in common far outnumber the differences, and that the metaphysical hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of the universe offered by panpsychists and by "speculative philosophers" are not necessarily opposed in such a sense that the one must be true and the other must be false.

This thoughtful small work by Mr. Gunn, who is a Fellow in the University of Liverpool, makes one more addition to the already long list of books on Bergson, running at present well beyond a score of titles in English alone. It is put forth "in the hope that it may be useful to the general reader and to the student of philosophy as an introduction and a guide to the study of Bergson's thought." The author keeps to his aim of exposition in a number of chapters on the now familiar topics of the Bergsonian philosophy, change, perception, memory, the relation of soul and body, time, the freedom of the will, evolution, and the method of intuition. There is an opening chapter on the life of Bergson, chronicling