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659 step in the logical journey towards the absolute, is the private conscience with its unquenchable desire to realize the general well-being. Duty is now the watch-word of the will,—duty which the individual thinks that he must perform though the heavens fall. He who insists upon doing his duty at whatever risk bears a higher mind than he who is continually demanding his rights. The antagonism of individual to individual is not found in duty and the good conscience, as it is in rights. The enemy, from the standpoint of duty, is not a fellow-mortal, but the prevalence of evil, of which other persons or institutions may of course be the champions. Yet since in the best judgment of the private conscience the actual condition of things may seem to be absolutely hostile to goodness, it is impossible to regard as final the conception of life implied in duty.

A club or association, organized for the purpose of promoting the well-being of humanity, does not really take us outside the limited space occupied by what Hegel calls morality. Such a club is plainly based on the notion that the world as a whole has fallen on evil days, and therefore seeks before all things the world's regeneration. But, as Hegel is fond of saying, it has not been left to our late day to begin the strife for the well-being of man. Hence while the work of the conscientious individual or association is not necessarily useless, it must be founded on a clear recognition of what mankind has already done. In such a case the private or voluntary society becomes a civic institution. Accordingly we pass to the third and final stage, from which we discern that spirit or reason is at home in the institutions of the state. The rational individual thus finds his own realization in carrying out the reason implied in these institutions. The significance of the second stage as regards freedom is that the ideas of conscience and duty imply a condemnation of the notion that any merely external law or prescript is authoritative. Reason, we insist, shall acknowledge only what is seen to be reasonable. Therefore, if freedom is to be harmonized with obedience, the object to be obeyed must be shown to be not the will of any man or class of men, but the necessary embodiment of reason. Otherwise we are justified