Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/661

645 If this be a complete account of moral obligation as it turns up in our concrete experience, it would be difficult to understand how so many different theories of obligation should have gained a footing in ethical philosophy. As the rival theories have failed to annihilate one another, there must be a relative truth expressed by each of them. And it is a fair assumption that each emphasizes some remote aspect of moral obligation ignored by the other. In that event there would correspond to the differences in ethical theory differences in men's moral experiences. It seems, however, that we all mean by obligation the same thing—submission to the requirements of the moral law. Such an ought-feeling I certainly hold to be ultimate. But there is an ulterior aspect to this uniformity which has, I think, been generally overlooked. Though we all feel it our duty to speak the truth, to deal justly, and to show mercy, the motives which reinforce the dutiful impulse are different with different individuals. Children feel they must do these things (when natural inclination and the mimetic instinct do not spontaneously prompt them) because their parents, or teachers, or friends require them. On the other hand, where an agent has made the moral ideal his own, and realizes that in this sphere he is self-legislative, the feeling of self-respect may overshadow the abstract ought-feeling. Again, in religious minds, there is associated with the sense of obligation a feeling of reverence and affection for God, in whom the moral ideal is believed to be actually and completely realized. In altruistic natures the feeling of obligation is overlaid with sympathy and enthusiasm for humanity; in egoistic natures by prudence and reasonable self-love. In sound, unreflecting natures, the ought-feeling is often buried under the inertia of training and custom. These several emotional reinforcements of the sense of obligation—and others might be added to the list—turn up in well-marked characters with which both life and literature make us familiar. Thus the man of the world has a keen appreciation of the market value of virtue; and though he may not be wholly irresponsive to the call of duty for duty's sake, there can be no doubt that his sense of